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THE

SPEECH

OF

PATRICK DUIGENAN, Esq. L. L. D.

IN THE

HOUSE OF COMMONS OF IRELAND,

FEBRUARY 5, 1800,

ON HIS EXCELLENCY THE LORD LIEUTENANT's MESSAGE

ON THE SUBJECT OF AN

INCORPORATING UNION

WITH

GREAT BRITAIN.

EARNESTLY RECOMMENDED TO THE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF

THE LOYAL CITIZENS OF DUBLIN.

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BRITISH MUSEUM

SPEECH

OF

PATRICK DUIGENAN, Esq. L. L. D.

&c. &c. &c.

Mr. Speaker,

I am unwilling to give my vote in ſupport of a meaſure of ſuch importance, as the conſolidation of the realms of Great Britain and Ireland by an incorporating Union, without explaining to my Countrymen the reaſons which have influenced me to contribute my weak aſſiſtance to ſo momentous a meaſure. I ſhall endeavour to compreſs them into as ſmall a compaſs as poſſible: premiſing, however, that I feel no inconſiderable portion of diſſatisfaction and regret in perceiving that my ſentiments on this occaſion are different from thoſe of many able men, as remarkable for their public ſpirit, as for integrity, extent and ſtrength of talents, natural and acquired, and with whoſe political opinions, ſince I took any part in public buſineſs, I have heretofore generally concurred. I confeſs that I feel ſome conſolation in obſerving, that I differ alſo in opinion on the preſent buſineſs from other Gentlemen, with whoſe politi-

cal opinions I never did, nor ever will concur; and, that although there is a diviſion among the loyal and ſtaunch friends of the Conſtitution on the preſent queſtion, yet there is an entire coincidence of opinion on it among all Jacobin Traitors throughout the kingdom,—they to a man are hoſtile to it,---their principles I abhor: and I cannot refrain from expreſſing my uneaſineſs at perceiving many loyal Citizens of Dublin in this particular, dupes to the practices and deceptions of that dangerous anarchical blood-thirſty crew. I am fortified in my opinion on this occaſion by reflecting, that, notwithſtanding the hoſtility of ſome able honeſt men to the meaſure, men of equal integrity and ability ſupport it, and I think the perſons of that deſcription, friends to it, are much more numerous than thoſe of the ſame deſcription, who appear in the ranks of the adverſary.

I ſhall firſt make a few obſervations on the preſent ſtate of the natural and political connexion between Great Britain and Ireland. The latter kingdom, from its geographical ſituation, is ſhut out from all intercourſe with the northern parts of Europe, except by the permiſſion of Great Britain: and as Great Britain lies between it and all parts of Europe, from Britanny to the Northern Pole, ſo it is in its power to prevent in a great meaſure its communication with all the ſouthern parts of Europe; for Ireland, in reſpect to all Europe, lies as it were behind Great Britain; it is alſo divided from Great Britain by a narrow channel only, extending the whole length of Ireland from North to South, in ſome places not above ſix leagues wide. Its political connexion with Great Britain I ſhall take up on the baſis of its ſettlement in 1782, which is now inſiſted upon by the adverſaries of an incorporating Union, as a final Settlement between the two kingdoms, never to be changed or altered. Ireland is connected with Great Britain by having one branch of its Legiſlative Power, to wit, the regal branch

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and the whole of its Executive Power, in common with Great Britain, and the perſon inveſted with its whole Executive Power, and with a part of its Legiſlative Power, endowed with a veto on all deliberative reſolutions of the other two branches of the Legiſlative, reſides in Great Britain: By the ſettlement of 1782, no bill, after it has paſſed the two Houſes of Parliament in Ireland can become a law, till after it has been ſent into Great Britain, under the Great Seal of Ireland, and is returned from thence under the Great Seal of Great Britain; that is in fact, 'till after it has been approved of by his Majeſty, and his Britiſh Cabinet Council; ſo that, under the Settlement of 1782, the Britiſh Miniſtry can prevent the enaction of any law whatſoever in this kingdom; and it ſeems to me that there is ſome inaccuracy in ſtating the Legiſlature of this Kingdom to be independent under theſe circumſtances. Certain I am, that I have heard grievous complaints of the control of the Britiſh Cabinet exerciſed over the Legiſlature of this Kingdom; and the diſaſtrous effects on this kingdom of a double Cabinet, Engliſh and Iriſh, very pathetically inſiſted upon by Gentlemen, who now oppoſe an Incorporating Union on the principle of its ſubverting the Settlement of 1782, and the Independence of this Kingdom. I have been ſomewhat ſurpriſed at finding this Houſe ſo frequently amuſed with declamations on the point, whether the Settlement of 1782 was intended by the two kingdoms as a final adjuſtment of all matters then in diſpute, ſo as effectually to ſecure their perpetual connexion neceſſary to the happineſs, almoſt to the exiſtence of both as free States, and to preclude all future poſſibility of ſeparation.—I look on the Queſtion, whether that Settlement at the time it was concluded, was conſidered or intended to be final or not, as totally immaterial. Debates upon it put me in mind of the conduct of Lawyers in a ſuit, as deſcribed by that

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ſagacious obſerver of mankind, Capt. Lemuel Gulliver:— "*In pleading,*' ſays the Captain, "*they ſtudiouſly avoid en-*
"*tering into the merits of the cauſe; but are loud, violent and*
"*tedious in dwelling upon all circumſtances which are not to the*
"*purpoſe; for inſtance, if my neighbour claims my cow, they*
"*never deſire to know what title my adverſary has to my cow;*
"*but whether the ſaid cow were red or black, her horns long or*
"*ſhort, whether the field I graze her in were round or ſquare,*
"*and the like.*"—The true queſtion on the Settlement of 1782 to be reſolved by this Houſe, is, whether that Settlement be ſuch as does effectually ſecure the perpetual Connexion of the two kingdoms? and not, whether it was conſidered as final at the time it was entered into?—Sir, the preſent Connexion between Great Britain and Ireland is ſuch as has no parallel in the hiſtory of the world: it contains in it anomalies heretofore unknown to the law of nations, and the ſeeds of diſſolution; theſe anomalies muſt be corrected, and theſe ſeeds muſt be effectually prevented from ſtriking roots, which can be only effected by an Incorporating Union of the two Kingdoms. Separation, or rather an unſucceſsful attempt at ſeparation, which will be attended with the utter ruin and deſolation of this kingdom by civil war, will be the unavoidable and neceſſary conſequence of the rejection of that only effectual remedy.—The preſent Connexion between theſe two Kingdoms is not ſimilar to an alliance offenſive and defenſive between two independent Nations, which depends on ſtipulations entered into by the two contracting parties for mutual defence and ſecurity; for, if the conditions of the alliance are not performed by one of them, the other may break off from the alliance, and look to other ſecurity, or take ſuch meaſures as it may think proper for its own defence, and may at any time enter into Leagues and Treaties with other Powers, not inconſiſtent with its offenſive and

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defenſive alliance; and either party has a right to proclaim war or make peace on reaſonable terms, and to call on the other to aſſiſt in war with its ſtipulated quota, or to concur in a pacification on reaſonable terms, or ſuch as it may deem reaſonable: but the caſe is quite otherwiſe with Ireland in reſpect to Great Britain; proclamation of war on the part of Great Britain againſt any power whatſoever immediately involves Ireland in hoſtilities, as part of the Britiſh Empire; and Great Britain may make Peace without conſulting in any manner with Ireland on the terms or conditions, and without ſtipulating in any manner for her indemnity or compenſation for her loſſes in the war. Ireland cannot enter into any Treaty whatſoever, either commercial or otherwiſe, with any foreign power, but is bound by all the Treaties into which Great Britain enters, without being even conſulted on the expediency of them.---Surely, Sir, theſe are great badges of dependency; I have heard Gentlemen at the other ſide of the Houſe complain bitterly of them; and, whilſt they aſſert the independence of this nation on Great Britain, and aſſert that ſuch independence was ſecured by the Settlement of 1782, and on that ſcore ſtruggle to ſupport that Settlement as final, and reprobate all alteration, and conſequently an incorporating Union, they cannot but admit the preſent connexion between the two nations, as ſettled in 1782, to be a connexion degrading, and in a high degree detrimental to this nation; and that it contains within itſelf a mine of combuſtibles, which one day or other will be ſprung, and involve the country in confuſion, ruin and deſolation, which it will take a century to repair. Excluſive of the aforeſaid great imperial ſources of diſcontent and animoſity between the two nations, ariſing from the very nature of their preſent connexion, are there no other

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cauſes of diſunion interwoven with it? What loud complaints have we repeatedly heard in this Houſe of the ſhackled ſtate of our commerce by our preſent connexion with Great Britain ſince the year 1782? Are theſe cauſes removed? It is admitttd that the Settlement of 1782 was not final with reſpect to the Tariff between the two Nations; we rejected the Commercial Propoſitions ſince 1782, which were deſigned to ſettle that Tariff, with diſdain, on a ſuppoſition that they trenched on our imaginary independence; profeſſing that we would not barter Conſtitution for commerce. Is the Channel Trade between Great Britain and Ireland yet ſettled to our ſatisfaction? Is the India Trade? Are numberleſs other cauſes of diſcontent, jealouſy and emulation on the point of trade between theſe two commercial and adjacent nations, yet removed? Are the mouths of our ranting patriots, continually bellowing in our ears, that the intereſts and purſuits of the two nations in point of trade are incompatible and irreconcilable; and that the animoſity of the inhabitants of the two countries is inſtinctive, yet cloſed? Or are they ever likely to be cloſed in the preſent ſtate of correſpondence and brittle connexion of the two countries? Surely not; the preſent connexion between them is rather a faithleſs Truce, *infidæ induciæ!* than a permanent ſtate of harmony and peace. Federal Unions, ſuch as was that of the United Provinces, being an union of a number of ſmall Republics for mutual defence, the preſent Union of the ſeveral States of America, and of the Germanic Body, have been always accounted weak and inefficient; we know by experience they are ſo: look to Germany, look to the United Provinces; they will all in proceſs of time ſubmit to the ſame fate with the United Provinces, that is, be reduced to ſlavery by a potent neighbour; or will break and ſeparate into diſtinct Sovereignties independent of each other. Yet the preſent connexion between

tween Great Britain and Ireland is more infirm and fleeting than even a federal Union: For in a federal Union an Aſſembly is formed by Deputies ſent from all the States which compoſe it, as the States General of the United Provinces, the Diet of the German Empire, the Congreſs of America, which Aſſembly is empowered to decide and determine on all matters neceſſary to their common ſecurity and intereſt, and to whoſe deciſions the whole Union is bound to ſubmit. But there is no ſuch common Aſſembly to ſupport the connexion between Great Britain and Ireland, and to conſult for the reſpective intereſts of both. Such a connexion can never be ſupported but by the decided ſuperiority of the one State, ariſing from ſuperior ſtrength and opulence, and the decided inferiority of the other in both particulars. Hence it ariſes, that it will always be the intereſt of the ſtronger to retain the weaker in its ſtate of inferiority; and of the weaker, to ſtruggle for equality at leaſt, and to endeavour to free itſelf from ſubjection to the other by every poſſible or feaſible means. Such a connexion is always hollow, attended by tumult and diſorders, conſtantly encreaſing and fermenting, and at length ending in civil war and abſolute ſubjugation; or ſeparation by the intereſted aſſiſtance of ſome ambitious neighbour. The probable durability of the preſent connexion between Great Britain and Ireland cannot be ſupported by any arguments drawn from the circumſtance, that his Majeſty and his Progenitors for three generations have enjoyed the Crown of Great Britain, and the Electoral dignity, as Sovereign of Hanover, without any convulſion, or probability of being diſturbed in the enjoyment of both; it cannot be from thence inferred, that the connexion of Great Britain and Ireland, which, ſince 1782, depends on their having a common Sovereign, may be reaſonably expected to endure without the proſpect of any convulſive pangs of diſunion or ſeparation. For the King of Great Britain is not Elector of Hanover, by virtue of

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his being King of Great Britain: And the intereſts of Great Britain and Hanover are ſo completely diſtinct, that the Engliſh Miniſtry can have no neceſſity of interfering with the Regency of Hanover, or its intereſts, external or internal, nor can they ever claſh: His Majeſty of Great Britain, as Elector of Hanover, is a vaſſal and ſubject of the Emperor; and Hanover is a Province of the German Empire, from which it cannot be ſevered whilſt the Germanic body exiſts; it never can have any further connexion with Great Britain than it has at preſent; and the intercourſe between the two countries is extremely confined, as Hanover lies on the Continent, is almoſt ſurrounded by the other German Provinces, and has but a very contracted communication with the ſea; nor can there exiſt any cauſe of diſſenſion between Gt. Britain and Hanover, conſidered as a diſtinct principality: and the King of Great Britain may ever remain a ſubject of the Empire, as Elector of Hanover, without the interference of Great Britain to ſupport his title to the Electorate, and without its being at all material to Great Britain, whether he is or is not Elector of Hanover. But every one of theſe circumſtances is directly reverſed when the connexion between Great Britain and Hanover is compared with that which has ſubſiſted between Great Britain and Ireland ſince the year 1782.

When Gentlemen inſiſt that the ſettlement between the two nations in 1782 is final, and conſequently wants no amendment or alteration, that it is of itſelf ſufficient to maintain a perpetual connexion between the two countries, and that any further union is unneceſſary; I cannot but wonder by what arguments many of them will ſupport their own conſiſtency. Gentlemen whom I have heard arguing with the utmoſt vehemence in every ſeſſion of Parliament ſince that period, for the neceſſity of alterations in the eſtabliſhed Conſtitution of Ireland, as well in reſpect to its internal proviſions for the government of the ſubjects, as in its external regulations reſpecting its connexion with England,

land, which they now aſſert were finally and for ever ſettled in 1782.—Witneſs the complaints of the inequality of the Channel Trade; of the excluſion from the Eaſt India Trade; of the importation of Engliſh Manufactures; of the contraction of the Colony Trade, and of the Woollen Manufacture of Ireland; the want of protecting Duties; of the interference of the Engliſh Cabinet with Iriſh Affairs; and of the double Cabinet; of the hiſtory of the connexion between Great Britain and Ireland, being a hiſtory of oppreſſion and injury on the part of Britain, as well before as ſince the year 1782; of fugacious Engliſh Adminiſtrations in Ireland not accountable for their conduct to the Iriſh Parliament; of Ireland being involved in the wars of Great Britain, without being conſulted on the expediency of war or peace, or having any power to promote or obſtruct either the one or the other; of the incapacity of Ireland to treat with Foreign States; its total deprivation of all federative capacity: with a multitude of other inconveniencies, defects and imperfections of the ſettlement of 1782; and perpetual declamations of the neceſſity of Reforms, Emancipation, &c. directly tending to the utter ſubverſion of the preſent Conſtitution and the ſettlement of 1782, yet theſe are the very Gentlemen who now reſt their principal argument againſt an incorporating Union on the perfection of the ſyſtem of 1782, inſiſting that all attempts further to ſtrengthen the connexion between the two realms as ſettled in 1782, and to extinguiſh national animoſities, are not only unneceſſary, but pernicious and deſtructive to Ireland.

I will now proceed to ſtate and anſwer the other objections which I have heard urged againſt an Incorporating Union of the two kingdoms; as I ſhall have an opportunity in my progreſs of ſtating, and I hope of proving, the poſitive advantages which muſt reſult to Ireland from it: and the ruin and deſtruction which will be the certain conſequences of its rejection. It is firſt objected, that

the independence of Ireland will be deſtroyed by an Incorporating Union with Great Britain. I have already pretty fully demonſtrated, that Ireland in its preſent ſituation cannot be conſidered as an independent Kingdom, properly ſpeaking: and beſides if independence applied to Ireland, means *the ſubſtantive Independence of a Kingdom, unconnected with any other Nation, ſave by treaties of amity containing reciprocal obligations entered into between equals, and poſſeſſing an Imperial Government within itſelf*; it is pretty plain to common underſtandings that Ireland in that ſenſe is not now an independent nation, for Ireland is a Province of the Britiſh Empire. The Crown of Ireland is not an Imperial Crown, it is inſeparably united, annexed to, and dependent upon the Imperial Crown of England, (now the Imperial Crown of Gt. Britain), and whoever is King of Gt. Britain, is ipſo facto, King of Ireland. Such is the language of our Statute law, repeated over and over again in our Statute books unrepealed, and which never can be repealed; becauſe his Majeſty of Great Britain can never give his Royal aſſent to any law authoriſing the ſpoliation of his Royal Diadem, by tearing the moſt valuable jewels from it, unleſs compelled by fatal neceſſity, and the ſucceſsful iſſue of Rebellion, which Heaven avert!—but ſhould it be even admitted that Ireland is an independent nation, how can it be inferred or proved that ſhe would loſe her independence, or any degree of independence which ſhe may now enjoy, by an incorporating Union with Great Britain? By ſuch Union ſhe becomes one body with Great Britain, and conſequently muſt enjoy equal independence with Great Britain: they will together form one conſolidated independent Empire: the part of that Empire Weſt of the Iriſh Channel, will be as independent as that part of England South of the Trent, and that part North of the Trent, or that part of Great Britain North of the Tweed; and Ireland will be no more a province dependent on England,

land, than England or Scotland are provinces dependent on Ireland, or on one another. The objection ſeems to me to be founded on ſophiſtry, on this deceitful poſition, *that each part of the ſame body, being dependent in ſome meaſure upon the reſt of the body, the whole thus compoſed of parts dependent on each other, cannot be ſaid to form one independent body, becauſe it is compoſed of dependent particles:* though whilſt they adhere together they form one body detached from all others. The Gentlemen who ſupport ſuch a dogma would do well to conſider how they can, in ſuch reaſoning, maintain the independence of Ireland: for by the ſame argument, the four provinces of Ireland being dependent each on the other three, the four together cannot form one independent body.

It is in the ſecond place objected, that the ſuperior number of Britiſh members in the Imperial Parliament, will give them the power of oppreſſing Ireland, and infringing the conditions on which an incorporating Union may be concluded.

I admit that there muſt be a power in all States paramount and ſupreme, that can alter or abrogate all the laws and regulations of the State, for the manifeſt good and advantage of the ſubjects, and enact new laws for the ſame purpoſes; but ſuch ſupreme power is reſtrained within the bounds of reaſon and juſtice, and the preſent argument is founded on a preſumption of fraud and ill-faith, which the principles of natural law, as well as the expreſs maxims of our own municipal law, forbid us to entertain. Our own law tells us that fraud is not to be preſumed. When King Henry VIII. conſulted the judges, then removable at the will of the Crown, on the queſtion whether a bill of attainder paſſed againſt a man by Parliament, then alſo enſlaved, without calling on the object of it to anſwer or give him a trial—would be valid? the judges told him that ſuch an act,

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from the tranſcendent power of Parliament, would be valid; but they truſted that ſo great and honourable a Tribunal as that of Parliament would never degrade itſelf, and make ſo flagitious an uſe of their ſupreme authority, as to adopt ſuch a proceeding againſt any man. And an anſwer of a ſimilar nature might be ſufficient to the preſent objection, the Parliament being now independent, becauſe there is a mighty difference between power itſelf and the juſt or unjuſt exerciſe of it; and the objection can have no weight if we are to preſume, as by law we are directed, that the Imperial Parliament will be guided by juſtice in their proceedings. But there ſtill remains a more powerful anſwer to the objection, and that is, that the conditions of an incorporating Union muſt be canvaſſed fully in the two Parliaments of Great Britain and Ireland, before any Union can be effected; and it is morally certain, that no conditions will be agreed to, which ſhall not be deemed by theſe Parliaments, who are ſuppoſed to underſtand the intereſts of their country, advantageous as well to the nations reſpectively, as to the empire at large. And when the two nations ſhall become one by an incorporating Union, can it be ſuppoſed that the Imperial Parliament will ever attempt to infringe the conditions promotive of the intereſt, of each country in particular, and of the whole body in general? Such a proceeding with reſpect to either country would injure the whole body, and would be therefore contrary to the intereſt of the infringers; as it would be deſtructive of the ſanity and ſtrength of the whole human body for all the parts, the leg excepted, to conſpire to wither the leg; therefore there can be no apprehenſion of the breach of the conditions of an incorporating Union by the Imperial Parliament, to the prejudice of Ireland; unleſs we ſhall ſuppoſe that the Britiſh Members ſhall all become blind, as well to juſtice as to their own intereſt. Beſides, it may be ſtipulated in the Treaty of Union, that

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any breach of the conditions ſhall be deemed a diſſolution of the Union; as was done in the Treaty of Union of England and Scotland; and experience has proved, that no attempt at a breach of the conditions of that Union was ever made. I can only conceive one caſe in which the conditions of an incorporating Union of Great Britain and Ireland may be altered, and that is, when all, or a very great majority of the Repreſentatives of one of the contracting nations, ſhall petition for an alteration of any of the articles which peculiarly affects one of them, without any ſpecial intereſt in the other to reſiſt ſuch a change: In that caſe I apprehend an alteration might be juſtly made, on the principle of *Volenti non fit injuria.*

It is objected 3dly, That Ireland by an Incorporating Union will become ſubject to the heavy Taxes and Debt of Great Britain.—This objection may be entirely done away, by inſerting ſtipulations in the Treaty of Union, that Ireland ſhall be only liable to ſuch portion of the public burthens, as are ſuitable to her means and finances. Such ſtipulations in favour of Scotland have been inſerted in the Treaty of Union between England and Scotland, and have never been violated.—But this objection is in truth founded on deception, for it is founded on the baſeleſs aſſumption, that Ireland, after an Incorporating Union ſhall take place, will remain in its preſent ſituation, or a worſe, in points of trade, improvement and opulence. Whereas it is obvious, that Ireland, poſſeſſing as fertile a ſoil as Great Britain, and being as advantageouſly ſituated for Commerce, when incorporated with that nation, muſt become in time, and not at very remote period, equal to Great Britain, in local population, commerce and wealth. Her inhabitants being then on an exact level with thoſe of Great Britain, intermixed with them, and becoming one people with them, the preſent induſtrious habits and purſuits of the one nation, its commerce

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and manufactures muſt be ſpeedily communicated to the other, and become common to both: and when we contemplate the happineſs, wealth and comforts of life which the inhabitants of Great Britain enjoy at preſent in a much ſuperior degree (though liable to the preſent heavy debts and taxes) to the inhabitants of Ireland, what Iriſhman would repine, or have cauſe to complain, if the inhabitants of Ireland were put on an exact level in all theſe particulars with the inhabitants of Great Britain? If we ſhall, in caſe of an Incorporating Union, have heavier taxes, they will be no grievances if we ſhall have more ample ſources of wealth, a greater capacity of paying, and greater funds remaining to expend on our comforts and enjoyments.—I am aware that it has been aſſerted by a very great and truly reſpectable authority, that the Trade of Ireland cannot and will not be increaſed by an Incorporating Union: and it has been attempted to be proved that the Trade of Ireland could not be injured by Great Britain, if ſhe ſhould deſign to injure it, for that Ireland has other and as lucrative markets for her commodities as Great Britain: my own want of ſkill in commercial affairs, and my ſettled opinion of the ability and extenſive information of the aſſerter of theſe doctrines, to me at leaſt novel, induced me, after their publication, to conſider them with great attention, to examine the documents on which they were founded, and to read the ſeveral anſwers to them which have appeared, as well in the Engliſh as the Iriſh Prints, and after the very beſt and moſt mature conſideration of them, I profeſs I cannot acquieſce in them; for, in the firſt place, as the proportionate commerce and opulence of Great Britain vaſtly exceed thoſe of Ireland, I cannot well conceive, when Ireland, ſituated as ſhe is, and poſſeſſing as fertile a ſoil as Great Britain, ſhall form one and the ſame body with Great Britain by an Incorporating Union, that part of that body ſhall

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continue in the greateſt health and vigour, and that another part, with all the vital juices in full and free circulation, without any obſtruction whatſoever to impede their courſe, ſhall remain in a debilitated and withered ſtate: on the contrary, I am clearly of opinion, that the wealth and commerce of Great Britain muſt by an Union be communicated with Ireland, and that Ireland will thereby acquire a proportionate and local equality in trade with Great Britain and every part of it.—In the ſecond place, I am convinced that Ireland is indebted for almoſt her whole commerce to Great Britain; ſhe has opened to Ireland the trade of her colonies; ſhe has ſhielded her principal manufactures, to which ſhe has opened her own markets, with bounties, and reſtrained the importation of manufactures of the ſame nature from other countries by duties.—At no other markets on the face of the globe could the manufactures of Ireland be diſpoſed of to the ſame advantage; ſhe affords a ready market, ready ſale, and ſpeedy return for the commodities of Ireland, which no other nation could afford, and which few would offer: nor could Iriſh capitals ſupport the ſame trade with other nations, who would require longer credits. Britiſh Fleets ſecure the foreign commerce of Ireland throughout the globe, and the hoſtility of Great Britain to Ireland would at once annihilate almoſt all Iriſh commerce and manufactures; and the balance of trade between Great Britain and Ireland is much in favour of the latter kingdom.

Fourthly, it is objected, that the City of Dublin will be depopulated and injured, and its trade ruined by an Incorporating Union. Of all the objections againſt the meaſure, this has the greateſt weight with the maſs of the people, and yet it is infinitely the weakeſt: Such has been the power of deception, that this fallacious argument has impoſed upon and miſled the loyal Citizens of Dublin, who in the late atrocious Rebellion ſo courageouſly

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ſtood forth the champions and the bulwarks of the Conſtitution in Church and State, and has ſo far blinded their underſtandings as to render them careleſs of their own preſervation, of their liberties and properties, and induced them to permit themſelves to be made the dupes and tools of the ſanguinary Jacobin Traitors, who ſo lately deluged their country with the beſt Proteſtant blood in the nation; the Conſpirators who originally planned that bloody inſurrection, and the ruffians employed in the maſſacres with which it was accompanied, and whoſe carcaſes juſtly forfeited to the law, have been bailed from the executioner, by what has been ſtiled the lenity of Government, now openly and triumphantly appear, leading the deluded citizens to the altars of rebellion, conſpiracy and ſedition, there to enter into engagements for the ſubverſion of the conſtitution, and to affix their ſignatures, at the deſire of the pardoned and ungrateful traitors, to the manifeſtoes of threatened and meditated inſurrection. Bound as I am from general, and in many inſtances perſonal attachment, gratitude and intereſt, to promote to the extremity of my abilities the welfare and proſperity of the city of Dublin, in which, though not my native place, I have been nurtured and educated from my early infancy; and which comprehends ſo many of my cloſeſt and moſt valued connexions, I cannot view with indifference this fatal deluſion of many of its moſt loyal and worthy citizens. I heartily deplore it, and ſhall uſe my endeavours to awake them to the calls of loyalty, honour, ſecurity and peace.

I have already, I truſt, proved, that the trade and wealth of Ireland muſt be increaſed by an Union, which will open ſources of commerce yet unknown in this country; it will increaſe wealth in the ſame proportion, and capital muſt increaſe by the additional ſecurity which the lives and properties of the inhabitants of Ireland will acquire by

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ſuch Union; and the city of Dublin muſt participate largely in the increaſed commerce, wealth and capital of the nation at large. Dublin is ſituated about midway in the Iriſh channel. Its port, though not acceſſible by ſhips of as great burthen as that of Liverpool, is a much better port than that of the latter place, much more eaſily acceſſible, and ſhips of three or four hundred tons, large enough for carrying on commerce to any part of the globe, may reſort to it. Dublin is capable of receiving great improvements as a commercial city, ſufficient to ſecure to it for ever a decided ſuperiority in point of trade over every other town in Ireland; and if an annual ſum ſhall be appropriated out of the treaſury for compleating the two canals, which communicate with it on the north and ſouth, (already far advanced) under proper regulations; ſo as to finiſh the water carriage from Dublin to the Shannon, it will extend into Connaught, and may be further extended in that province by means of the river Suck. Such an improvement will ſecure for ever to Dublin the excluſive import and export trade of this iſland, in a tract of country the beſt in the Kingdom, of near one hundred miles broad, and reaching almoſt from the channel to the Weſtern Ocean. The compleating theſe canals, at the public expence, may be made one of the articles of the Union, and will alone compenſate tenfold for any partial loſs which it is ſuggeſted that Dublin may ſuffer by it; for it is not even pretended that the nation at large will ſuffer by an Union in point of commerce; all that is attempted to be proved (and the proof has totally failed) is, that Ireland will not gain in point of trade by this meaſure. Other advantages to the city of Dublin, not prejudicial to the kingdom at large, may be ſtipulated for in the treaty of Union.

We are now to conſider what the loſs is, that it is ſuggeſted the city will ſuſtain by an incorporating Union.

It is ſuggeſted, that many other port towns will riſe in commerce on the ruins of that of Dublin in caſe of an Union. I cannot ſee any reaſonable ground for ſuch ſuggeſtion; but if there is any, I have already pointed out an effectual method, not only to ſecure Dublin in its preſent trade, but to increaſe it to a degree hitherto never experienced or hoped for.---It is next ſuggeſted, that Dublin will decay, as well in population as trade, by its ceaſing to be the annual place of meeting of Parliament; and that abſentees will be increaſed, as well from Dublin as from the reſt of the kingdom, by an Union, which will therefore drain the kingdom in general, and Dublin in particular, of great ſums of money annually. I cannot think that the kingdom in general, or Dublin in particular, will be drained of great ſums of money by the increaſe of abſentees, which, it is ſuppoſed, will happen on an Union taking place; for I do not think that it will cauſe any very material increaſe of abſentees. Already our abſentees, and moſt of them of very great landed eſtates, are very numerous, and moſt of our nobility and conſiderable gentry, who are reputed reſidents, ſpend their ſummers, or a conſiderable part of them, in England, either in or near London, or at the ſeveral watering places in England. Thirty of our Peers, and one hundred of our Commoners, are to ſit in the Imperial Parliament; of theſe commoners, ſixty-four are to be elected for the counties at large, eighteen more for cities or towns, which are alſo counties, and the remainder for corporate towns, conſiderable for their population and extent: ſo that almoſt the whole of the Iriſh Repreſentatives in the Commons of the Imperial Parliament, will be returned on popular elections. And all ſuch perſons, to ſecure their intereſts in the counties and towns which they repreſent, will be obliged to ſpend their ſummers (the ſeaſons of receſs of the imperial parliaments)

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among their Iriſh conſtituents, inſtead of ſpending them, as they now do, in England. Of the thirty Peers, who are to repreſent the Iriſh Peerage in the Imperial Parliament, many will be ſuch as at preſent ſpend their whole time, or almoſt the whole in England; from whence I infer, that Ireland in general will not ſuffer conſiderably, perhaps not at all, by an Union. The city of Dublin will certainly loſe the partial reſidence of ſome of the members of parliament annually, but not of all; for many perſons who are now members of the Iriſh parliament, ſuch as the whole body of lawyers now in Parliament, and many others who always reſide in or near Dublin, and who will not be of the number elected to the Imperial Parliament, will continue to reſide in their uſual places of abode. The city will alſo continue the metropolis of the kingdom, the ſeat of the courts of juſtice, and of the viceroy; and upon the whole, cannot, by my computation, ſuffer any greater annual loſs than about fifty thouſand pounds, perhaps leſs, by an union; and will certainly be a gainer of ſeveral hundreds of thouſands annually by the means I have ſuggeſted, and by other ſtipulations in its favour, which may be inſerted in the treaty of incorporating union: And the city of Dublin will be certainly increaſed, as well in wealth as population, by ſuch a meaſure. Pending the treaty for an union between England and Scotland, the ſame methods for inflaming the inhabitants of Edinburgh to oppoſe that meaſure, were adopted by a diſcontented party in that kingdom, as are now made uſe of to inflame the citizens of Dublin: Yet Edinburgh, in leſs than a century ſince that union took place, has been more than doubled in extent and in population: and in trade, wealth and magnificence improved tenfold. My arguments are therefore warranted, not by reaſon only, but experience; and the citizens of Dublin will ſoon have good cauſe to reprobate and execrate

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the fraudulent and ſanguinary jacobinical aſſaſſins, by whom they are at preſent ſo fatally miſled.

It is in the fifth place objected, that the Iriſh Parliament is not competent to enter into and conclude a treaty with the ſiſter kingdom for an incorporating union. The competency of the Iriſh Parliament to ſuch a meaſure, has been ſo fully and ably proved by an hon. member of this Houſe, in his ſpeech on the expediency of an union in the laſt ſeſſion of parliament, which ſpeech has been ſince printed; and the futility and ineptitude of the objection ſo fully expoſed, that it is not neceſſary for me to be at much trouble, in ſcouting that phantom of forenſic quibbling inanity out of this Houſe. A brief examination of this doctrine of incompetency of Parliament on the preſent occaſion, may however not be amiſs. The beſt writers on the Britiſh conſtitution, and thoſe who have wound up their ideas of true political liberty to the higheſt tone which can conſiſt with any harmony or ſtability of Government, Mr. Locke in particular, lay it down as a maxim, that each member of the commonwealth has ſurrendered to the ſtate, or ſupreme legiſlative power, and veſted in it, all his rights under the law of nature. In the 11th chapter of Mr. Locke's treatiſe on government, is to be found the following paſſage: *The ſupreme legiſlative power in every commonwealth is the joint power of every member of the ſociety, given up to that perſon or aſſembly which is legiſlator, and is what thoſe perſons had in a ſtate of nature before they entered into the ſociety, and gave up to the community.* A little further on he adds, *This power, in the utmoſt bounds of it, is limited to the public good of the ſociety.* And in the cloſe of his 19th chapter he writes thus, *The power which every individual gave the ſociety, when he entered into it, can never revert to the individuals again, as long as the ſociety laſts, but will always remain in the community; becauſe without this there can be no community, no commonwealth, whic*

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is contrary to the original agreement. So alſo, when the Society hath placed the Legiſlative in any Aſſembly of men to continue in them and their ſucceſſors with direction and authority of providing ſuch ſucceſſors, the Legiſlative (which he in all places ſtiles the Supreme Power) can never revert to the People whilſt that Government laſts: Becauſe having provided a Legiſlative with power to continue for ever, they have given up their political power to the Legiſlative, and can never reſume it. Monteſquieu, in the 6th Chapter of his 11th Book, where he treats of the Engliſh Conſtitution, lays it down as a maxim: *That the People ought to have no ſhare in the Government, but for the chooſing of Repreſentatives which is within their reach.* It is notorious, that a man in a ſtate of nature has full authority and power to join any other man or ſet of men, and to form with them a community, or to connect himſelf with a community already formed, and become a member of that community which is willing to receive him as a member. This natural right each man has given up to the community, and the Supreme Legiſlative Power of the community is inveſted with that right, and conſequently is competent to join any other community or commonwealth in an incorporating Union, and to bind all the ſubjects of the State to that incorporation; and that power of the Legiſlative is bounded only by the public good of the ſociety, of which it is a better judge than tumultuous unconſtitutional and illegal aſſemblies of the people, and of which, the members of the Commonwealth when they elected them their Repreſentatives, ſuppoſed them to be the beſt judges. Mr. Locke publiſhed his treatiſe on Government in the year 1690; he had been the Secretary and Confidant of the famous Earl of Shafteſbury; and had been educated at Oxford, during the domination of the Republican Fanatics, and was brought up in the extremity of Whig principles, and publiſhed his Work at the time civil diſſenſions were

were at the higheſt, for the purpoſe of juſtifying the Revolution, at that time a recent tranſaction not compleatly and fully eſtabliſhed. One principal accuſation againſt the abdicated Family was, that they deſigned to ſubjugate the kingdom to France. This deſign was principally attributed to Charles the Second, and his miniſtry, and was one of the accuſations of Lord Shafteſbury, the patron of Mr. Locke, againſt the Court in the reign of that Monarch. Mr. Locke therefore in his 19th Chapter on the diſſolution of Governments, ſtates, rather too largely, *that the alteration of the Legiſlative is a diſſolution of Government:* And then ſubjoins, *that the delivery of the People into the ſubjection of a foreign Power, either by the Prince, or the Legiſlative, is certainly a change of the Legiſlative, and ſo a diſſolution of the Government.* In reſpect to the firſt poſition of Mr. Locke, that a change of the Legiſlative is a diſſolution of Government: I believe the Gentlemen who oppoſe this meaſure, will ſcarcely ſubſcribe to the truth of it: For they have for a ſeries of years been preaching on the neceſſity of a change in the Legiſlative, as well by aboliſhing moſt of the Boroughs, as by new-modelling the remainder; and by extending the Elective Franchiſe to large bodies of the People, heretofore diſqualified by the Laws of the Commonwealth: Some of which pretended Reforming ſchemes have ſucceeded, and all which would immediately operate as alterations in the Legiſlative Body. But it is neceſſary to advert to the ſecond poſition of Mr. Locke, and to try whether the concluſion of a Treaty of Incorporating Union with Great Britain by the Iriſh Legiſlature, on terms of abſolute equality and communication of all privileges, can be deemed a delivery of the Iriſh Nation into a ſubjection to a *foreign Power.* It is to be obſerved in the firſt place, that Great Britain in reſpect to Ireland is not a *foreign* Power; both Nations

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compoſe one Empire, whoſe intereſts with reſpect to all other Nations is one and the ſame. Secondly, the Legiſlatures of the two Nations are not diſtinct and ſeparate in their preſent condition: For one branch of the Legiſlative, and the Supreme Executive, is one and the ſame in both. —Thirdly, the Iriſh Legiſlative is not a ſupreme power in Ireland, for the exerciſe of its authority may be at all times cramped and impeded by the Engliſh Cabinet in many and moſt inſtances; and it has no federative or imperial authority reſpecting foreign nations, nor has its Executive any ſuch authority, as derived from the Iriſh Legiſlature; and if the Iriſh Legiſlature veſted their whole Legiſlative Authority in the Britiſh Legiſlature, ſuch a proceeding would not amount to the ſubjection of the Iriſh Nation to a *foreign* Power, even on Mr. Locke's principles, and to a conſequent diſſolution of Government. But an Incorporating Union with Great Britain admits of no ſuch interpretation, as the delivery of the Iriſh Nation to *ſubjection to Great Britain.* Iriſh Peers and Iriſh Repreſentatives of the Commons will ſit in the Imperial Parliament with equal privileges, liberties, and immunities with Britiſh Peers and Britiſh Repreſentatives; the ſuperior numbers of the latter claſſes to thoſe of the former, ariſing from ſuperior extent and opulence of the Britiſh Nation, can never, as I truſt I have already proved, operate to the peculiar diſadvantage of Ireland; there can be no inequality of intereſt between the limbs of the ſame body, and conſequently no ſubjection, unleſs the due ſubordination of all the parts of a body, to ſerve in their reſpective functions for the general and common advantage of the whole, be ſubjection. The Repreſentative form of Government will be preſerved in its purity and vigour, under the ſame Sovereign, the ſame Executive; and no objection on the ſcore of change of the Legiſlature

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can, as I apprehend, come with any degree of conſiſtency from the oppoſite ſide of the Houſe founded on the diminution, or rather annihilation of the Iriſh Borough Repreſentation in the new ſyſtem, which Repreſentation they have ſo often declaimed againſt, nor from the junction of the Peerage and Repreſentatives of the Commons in both Nations in the ſame Houſes, upon perfect terms of equality; bound together by the ties of common intereſt, to provide for the ſafety and proſperity of the whole Empire in general, and of each Nation in particular.

The laſt objection which I have heard urged againſt an Incorporating Union, is, that Ireland will be thereby reduced to the condition of a dependent Province.—To this it is a full anſwer, that Ireland by an Incorporating Union will become, from a really dependent Province, a part of the Britiſh Empire, equally independent with every other part of it; that England and Scotland are Provinces of the Britiſh Empire, and Ireland will be a Province no more dependent on any Power whatſoever, than England and Scotland are; all the Provinces of an Empire, ſuch as the Britiſh, the very baſis of whoſe Government is political Liberty, are ſo far dependent, the one on the other, as that they are all obliged to concur in the means for their common preſervation, and without ſuch concurrence they would all yield to a foreign Power: in ſuch light, but in no other, are they dependent, the one on the other, for mutual defence and ſecurity: and may they ever continue in that ſenſe dependent, and be for ever indiſſolubly united!

It is worth while now to beſtow a little conſideration on what will be the fate of Ireland, in caſe an Incorporating Union be rejected.—In the firſt place it is evident, from the various cauſes of diſpute and animoſity between Great Britain and Ireland, now ſubſiſting under their preſent ſyſtem

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of precarious and imperfect connexion, and from the turbulence, avarice and ambition of ſome, and jacobinical, anarchical revolutionary principles of other agitators, with whom the country is at preſent curſed; who have falſely aſſumed, and thereby debaſed and degraded the title of Patriots; and from the bitter and malignant ſpirit of a great portion of the lower order of our inhabitants, inſpired by the principles of a gloomy, unſociable, unrelenting, ſanguinary ſuperſtition, of perverted religion, that the two Nations cannot be kept together for any conſiderable time by their preſent frail and brittle bonds of connexion. Separation, therefore, or rather an attempt at ſeparation, from Britain, will be the certain conſequence of the rejection of this meaſure. I will firſt aſſume, that a ſucceſsful attempt at ſeparation ſhall be effected; it muſt, if at all, be effected by Rebellion, and the aſſiſtance of a French army: the civil war will waſte this unhappy Country from one extremity to the other; and excluſive of the miſerable ſlaughter attendant on a civil war, the whole moveable property of the nation, and all its improvements, will be deſtroyed and ruined, and the ſucceſsful ſurviving rebel will have the miſerable triumph of ſubjecting himſelf and his poſterity to the bondage of France, and becoming a member of a wretched, impoveriſhed, democratic Republic, which will itſelf be a ſlave to French democracy. Ye Proteſtants of Ireland, let me call your attention to what will be your lot in ſuch an event.—No ſucceſsful attempt at ſeparation can be made without your aſſiſtance and co-operation; you are now poſſeſſed of infinitely the greateſt portion of wealth and property, moveable and immoveable, of the nation; you will therefore be infinitely the greateſt loſers by a Rebellion, which will be a gulph to ſwallow up all property; you muſt aſſociate yourſelves and be companions in arms with the hungry French aſſaſſins, and murderous crew of United

Iriſhmen; you do not amount to more than one-third of the inhabitants of Ireland, the other two-thirds are your mortal enemies, as well on the ſcore of your religion, as your riches: when you ſhall have aſſiſted in your own ruin, and ſeparated yourſelves from Britain, and concurred in eſtabliſhing a democratic Iriſh Republic; when you ſhall be reduced to the ſame equality of indigence which in ſuch caſe muſt be the lot of all; when therefore perfect equality of beggary is introduced, and the Iriſh Nation is become the vaſſal of France, do you expect that you will have any ſecurity for your lives? Will the deſcendants of the Iriſh murderers in 1641, who maſſacred in cold blood ſuch multitudes of your anceſtors, now double your numbers, and on a level with you in all other reſpects, and aſſiſted by the ſanguinary French robbers in the event of a ſucceſsful rebellion, abſtain from their habits of murder? Does their recent conduct at Scullabogue, at Wexford, at Vinegar-hill, inſpire you with hopes of ſafety, when they ſhall have you in their power? As well may the trembling hind, incloſed in the paws of the ravenous hungry tyger, hope for mercy! The pike and the ſkeine will ſoon diſpatch ſuch remnant of you as may ſurvive the horrors and miſeries of even a ſucceſsful Rebellion. And you, ye deluded Citizens of Dublin, whom traitors have found means to detach from your true intereſts, have you ever conſidered what is to be the unavoidable fate of your City in caſe of a ſeparation from Great Britain—which, as I have already ſtated, can never be effected except by Rebellion and deſolation? Even one year's war between Great Britain and Ireland would annihilate your trade, as well as the trade of the whole eaſtern coaſt of Ireland.—The naval force of Liverpool alone, which in the war before the preſent almoſt annihilated the trade of France, would completely lock up all the Iriſh ports in the Channel, and would not ſuffer one

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ſhip to ſail in or out of them, and in caſe of a ſeparation of the two Countries, as they would certainly be in a ſtate of almoſt perpetual war, whatever trade Ireland would enjoy, and it could be very little, its weſtern ports would engroſs it, and Dublin would be effectually ruined. Such a ſtate of ſeparation, effected by a ſucceſsful rebellion, would, in fact, in the firſt place deſolate the kingdom, and deſtroy one half of its inhabitants; and in the next place would deprive the whole nation of almoſt all trade, entirely prevent its recovery, and reduce it to, and keep it in, the moſt miſerable ſituation that any nation could be poſſibly reduced to. All that I have here mentioned would be the inevitable conſequences of a ſucceſsful rebellion, and conſequent ſeparation; but what would be the effects of an unſucceſsful rebellion in the cauſe of meditated ſeparation? for it is morally certain that ſuch rebellion and ſuch attempt would be unſucceſsful. No perſon who knows the ſituation natural and political of Great Britain and Ireland, can deny, that Ireland of itſelf is unable to cope with Great Britain even if the inhabitants of Ireland were unanimous: but it is notorious, in caſe a rebellion was to break out for ſeparation, that the country would be divided, and that before ſuch rebellion could rage for one year, all the Proteſtants of Ireland, that is almoſt the whole property of the kingdom, would find it their intereſt to join the King's ſtandard. The bloody remorſeleſs cruelty, and inſatiable thirſt for plunder, of the reſt of their countrymen, would ſoon convince them of the neceſſity of uſing their arms againſt them. The preſent feeble ſtate of the French Marine, and the exhauſted ſtate of that wretched nation in general, would deprive the rebels of any effectual aſſiſtance from that quarter. When the whole Iriſh nation, (a handful of Proteſtants in the North of the kingdom excepted) took arms in the year 1688 in favour of King James the ſecond, and the French Monarch,

Louis

Louis XIV. at that time in the zenith of his glory, ſent a French army, and an immenſe ſupply of all kinds of military ſtores to their aſſiſtance, and when his navy rode triumphant on the ocean, England reduced the whole kingdom to the moſt abject ſubmiſſion in two campaigns; and ſimilar will be the event of any Iriſh Rebellion undertaken in the cauſe of ſeparation; but it will be attended with infinite calamity to the inhabitants of Ireland of all deſcriptions. We have now our choice, whether we will ruſh on our own ruin, or embrace with joy the meaſure of an Incorporating Union, the ſure pledge of national happineſs, proſperity and ſecurity. Unconnected as I am with the Government, or its Miniſters both in England and Ireland, and attached to it only as a good and loyal ſubject, in ſpite of clamour and faction, I muſt expreſs my ſincere wiſh that the nation may adopt the latter meaſure. I have long ſince made my choice;

Non ardor Civium prava jubentium
Mente quatit ſolidâ.

FINIS.

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